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Abstract 
The aim of the article is to show how in Italy the traditional inequalities in class, 
gender and geography have been matched by an inequality linked to 
immigration, whose causes, forms and social consequences I will analyse here. In 
so doing I will underline how such inequality linked to immigration is an 
integral part of the system of social inequalities existing at global level and in 
particular it is part of the globalization of inequality linked to immigration. 
Over the last few decades, there has been a deep social transformation at world 
level which has changed the system of inequalities; new inequalities were 
created, among which, the inequality linked to immigration is rather important. 
Historically, this is certainly nothing new, yet we are witnessing a globalization 
of inequality linked to immigration, which refers to disparities and social 
advantages that affect immigrant populations and citizens with migratory 
background. This phenomenon has several causes, but it is mainly due to two 
elements: the systematic use by several countries of an exploited and stigmatised 
migrant workforce, kept in a condition of social inferiority and with half the 
rights of the rest of the population; the globalisation of selective, restrictive and 
repressive immigration policies.  
Such process is quite visible in Italy, where inequality based on immigration is 
the result of the combined action of labour market, legal system, and mass 
media, which have pursued rationales, which led to the social inferiority and 
segregation of immigrants. Such inequality involved specific generative 
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mechanisms such as the selection, precarisation and differential exploitation of 
migrant workers, the creation of a special legislation, the systematic 
stigmatisation of immigrant populations in the public discourse, the comeback of 
the rhetoric of assimilation. Such inequality is multidimensional as, from work to 
health, from living to education, from public images to legal conditions, it affects 
all aspects of the social life of immigrants; and it is a challenge to social 
citizenship. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last few decades, there has been a deep and unrestrained process of 
social transformation at world level, in the wake of neo-liberalism. Such global 
restructuring – which took place in a slow and fragmented way in the 80’s, and 
in a more organic and faster way in the 90’s and 2000’s – is a unitary process that 
has worked at global level and, from the macro to the micro domain, it has 
restructured economies, work organisation, the structures and shapes of states, 
daily lives, social rights and the system of inequalities. 
Old international inequalities have undergone a radical rearrangement: in what 
may seem a contradiction, on one hand inequalities between countries have been 
relatively mitigated in a number of cases (after the recovery of some countries of 
the South of the world and the inclusion of the BRICS in the world market), on 
the other hand they have been harshened in terms of global inequalities and 
inequalities within countries (Alvaredo et al. 2018; Milanovic 2005, 2016; 
Therborn 2006). The aggravation of social polarisation within each country is a 
truly global phenomenon, and it is not an exaggeration to talk about the 
globalisation of social polarisation within countries. It took place in different 
ways and degrees according to the geographical context and, with a very few 
exceptions, it roughly presented two phases: an acceleration from the early 80’s 
to the mid-2000, and a super-acceleration with the great crisis of 2008. The 
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economic crisis has broadened and deepened, but not created, such process, from 
which a sort of global apartheid seemed to emerge.  
At the same time, new inequalities formed – adding up to the old ones without 
replacing them – among which, a noteworthy one is inequality linked to 
immigration, inequality by nationality linked to migration, to the fact of having 
migrated to a foreign country. Inequality based on immigration can be defined – 
using a concept historically used in the USA and in the UK – a racial inequality 
or ethno-racial inequality and it refers to disparities and social advantages that 
affect immigrant populations and citizens with migratory background1, refers to 
inequalities (in the field of income, wealth, housing, health, education, rights, 
etc.) between majority and migrant nationality groups, between national workers 
and migrant workers within a country.   
Historically, inequality linked to immigration is certainly nothing new (Potts 
1990; Sayad 1999), on the contrary, yet today we are living a fully-fledged 
globalisation of inequality based to be an immigrant, linked to immigration. In 
the wake of the formation of the world market and world labour market, on the 
basis of the globalization of industrial processes and market economy, in Europe, 
USA, Japan, but also in the Middle East, in South America, in Asia, a large part of 
the immigrant populations lives a condition of inequality (at economic, juridical, 
and symbolic level) compared to the autochthonous populations. This 
phenomenon, I repeat, is not new, but compared to the past, today it is much 
more widespread and presents itself as a unitary process. It has several causes, 
which vary according to national contexts, but it is mainly due to three common 
elements: 1) the systematic use by several countries of an exploited and 
stigmatised migrant workforce, kept in a condition of social inferiority and with 
half the rights of the rest of the population, to lower the cost of labour and 
compete on global markets; 2) the globalisation of selective, restrictive and 
                                                          
1 See Bonilla-Silva (2003), Novick (1995), Solomos (2003). Everyone knows that races do 
not exist, but on the social level, on the level of social relations, they exist and are more 
alive than ever; very often in Europe migrants are considered as inferior races (even if 
they have a white skin) or – using common terms – inferior cultures, inferior peoples, 
inferior ethnicities (Basso 2016). 
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repressive migration policies, with States and governments competing in the 
harshening of condition of migration and worsening of immigrants’ conditions; 
3) the convergence of processes of work casualisation and precarisation of 
migration on immigrant workers, that live a condition of double precarity. 
A noteworthy example of the process of creation of an inequality linked to 
immigration from Global South is Italy, where the latter added up to class, 
gender, generation and geographical inequalities, traditionally established.  
The aim of this article is to show how in Italy the traditional inequalities have 
been matched by an inequality linked to immigration, whose causes, forms and 
social consequences I will analyse here. In so doing I will underline how such 
racial inequality linked to immigration is an integral part of the system of social 
inequalities existing at global level and in particular it is part of the globalization 
of inequality linked to immigration. 
Such new inequality in Italy is the result of a discrimination system affecting 
structurally all aspects of immigrants’ life and of the social relationships between 
the Italian society and immigrant populations; in particular, it is the result of the 
combined action of at least three structures of social stratification – the labour 
market, the legal system, the mass-media – that have pursued rationales which 
led to social inferiority and segregation. Such inequality, affecting immigrant 
populations in different ways, has seen the application of specific generative 
mechanisms such as the selection, the precarisation and differential exploitation 
of immigrant workers, the creation of a special legislation, the systematic 
stigmatisation in the public discourse, the comeback of the rhetoric of 
assimilation. Such inequality is multidimensional as, from work to health, from 
living to education, from public images to legal conditions, it affects all aspects of 
the social life of immigrants (Saraceno et al. 2013).  
Before delving into the analysis, it should be underlined that the original deep 
cause of this inequality lies in “ordinary racism” within the Italian society (Balbo 
and Manconi 1990), especially in the unstoppable rise of institutional racism that 
has taken place over the last fifteen years, which has entailed a thorough 
racialisation of social relations (Basso 2010). 
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2.RACISM AND INEQUALITY AT WORK. 
 
In Italy, immigrants’ work is marked across the table – from access to work to 
unemployment, from tasks to remuneration, from professional status to mobility, 
from work accidents to social security – by inequalities, compared with national 
workers (Fullin and Reyneri 2011; Idos 2016; Moressa 2012). 
Immigrant workers – around 2,400,000 people, i.e. 10% of the total employed 
workers – suffer a significant work segregation concentrating them mainly in 
low-skilled manual jobs (Moressa 2014, 44). The majority is employed in the 
lower segments of the labour market, in low-paying and low-skilled jobs, more 
tiresome and unhealthier, such as construction worker, farm labourer and 
janitor, domestic help and caregiver, in the sectors of low-skilled services (to 
companies, to families), hotels and restaurants, metal and tanning industries, 
textiles and construction, seasonal agriculture and agri-food. In 1999, 77.3% were 
qualified general workers and labourers (Fieri-Ilo 2003), while in 2012 were still 
87.1% compared to 39.6% of the national workers (Moressa 2012, 33). In the last 
years the increase in immigrant workers has always taken place almost 
completely within low-skilled jobs, thus consolidating the channelling and 
ethno-racial segmentation of the labour market; in 2016, more than two thirds 
were qualified general workers and labourers (Unar 2016, 255-263).   
Immigrant workers are often under-classified, and for a longer period compared 
to national workers. Over-education – i.e. having a job requiring a lower set of 
skills compared to the education obtained – affects 40.9% immigrant workers and 
21.6% national workers (Idos 2016, 262); employment under-classification, i.e. 
having an employment contract corresponding to a lower level compared to the 
tasks carried out, is very common among migrant workers, with negative 
consequences on wages. In the construction sector, where the presence of 
immigrant workers is quite noteworthy, in 2008 only 4% were classified as 4th 
level skilled worker, whereas the majority was classified as labourer and 
ordinary worker (Galossi and Mora 2008); in 2013, 55% of them worked as 
ordinary worker compared to 28% of national workers, 4th level and skilled 
workers were only 13% of immigrants compared to 36.5% of national workers 
(Fillea-Cgil 2013). 
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Over education and under-classification of immigrant workers are constantly fed 
by several factors, among which two stand out: the continuous relapse in 
underground economy and administrative irregularity, following work precarity 
and permanent under-employment; and the increase in immigrant workers in 
the low-skilled services sector, mainly due to the growth in female employment 
as houseworkers and caregivers, and the shift of a remarkable number of male 
workers coming from factory work. The economic crisis has enlarged and 
amplified the over education and under-classification of immigrant workers as, 
in the context of high unemployment and harshening of migration policies, in 
order to find or keep a job enabling them to obtain or renew their residence 
permit, immigrants are forced to accept a lower classification, relinquishing 
career growth or the expectation to see their qualifications acknowledged. 
The majority of immigrant women is employed in housework, care work, 
services, as domestic help, caregivers, cleaners, waitresses. In these sectors they 
easily find a job – given the increase in the demand of services identified as 
“female work”, migratory chains and the functioning of niche economies – but at 
the same time they are cages outside of which employment opportunities are 
very limited. The average monthly wage of immigrant women is very low (822 
euro); work segmentation based on gender and nationality, together with their 
concentration in low level services, is mirrored in a significant wage difference, 
both compared to immigrant men (1,122 euro) and Italian women (1,202 euro) 
(Idos 2016, 262), confirming the three-fold oppression affecting immigrant 
women (because women, workers, foreigners; Anthias 1992; Morokvasic 1983). 
As for houseworkers and caregivers (a little over a million, a part of which works 
without a contract), they undergo, globally, a situation of work segregation, with 
tough consequences on their material and life conditions. 
Immigrant workers are affected by a higher unemployment (16.2% vs 11.4% 
among national workers) and under-employment rate (11.7% vs 4.2%) and by a 
wide contract precarity that lasts longer than national workers (Idos 2016, 262). 
When the economic crisis hit, immigrant and national workers were both 
affected by unemployment and under-employment, yet the former suffered the 
hardest situation due to their penalisation in firing provisions and in enjoying 
social safety nets. 
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A good portion of the unemployed has found a new job, completely or partly 
irregular, thus enlarging the underground economy, a structural element of the 
Italian economy and a source of attraction of undocumented migration. The 
entry (or relapse) in the underground economy has entailed a worsening of the 
working conditions – from wages to hours, from tasks to safety – and a lower 
protection from discrimination in the workplace. In such permanent circulation 
between administrative and contract regularity and irregularity, the 
deterioration of working conditions and the weakening of their position on the 
labour market have taken place. 
These elements, associated to working conditions which are not improving with 
length of service, to a marked presence in jobs with little career opportunities 
and little wage raises linked to the length of service, take their toll on wages, 
which are lower than those of national workers (mean net monthly wage: 979 € 
vs 1362 €) (Idos 2016, 255–262). Such wage differences are also linked to the size 
of the company and the working sector: among immigrants, more than among 
locals, employment mainly takes place in small-sized companies, where there are 
higher chances of worse working conditions. 
Such wages place immigrant workers and their families in the lower-paid income 
layers of Italian society. Together with young precarious couples, single mothers, 
people over 50 years of age expelled early from the labour market, immigrant 
workers and their families are an important component of the worse-off social 
layers. The creation of this lower layer of very-low income workers and poor 
immigrant families (in 2015 immigrant families had, on average, an income 
corresponding to two-thirds the income of Italian families: 19,725 € vs 30,320 €; 
Istat 2015), has taken place simultaneously with processes of decline in wages, 
multiplication of the working poor, social polarisation, shrinking of the middle 
class, which have affected the Italian society over the past two decades. Though a 
fair share of the hard conditions of immigrant families may be comparable to 
those of many Italian families which are poor, impoverished or at risk of poverty, 
the economic crisis affected immigrant families the hardest, also considering that 
earned income and subsidies for income support (unemployment, family 
allowances) are the main source of income of immigrant families, while, unlike 
for locals, earnings deriving from land, pensions and buildings (19% of 
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immigrant families are home-owners, compared to 80% of Italian families) are 
quite negligible (Unar 2016; Istat 2017). 
The condition of immigrant workers presents specific critical situations on the 
access to work, task distribution, or mobility. The majority of them reaches 
higher qualifications and wages very slowly, also because they are employed in 
jobs offering fewer career opportunities; often career development is linked to 
migration seniority, but itself is more than sometimes a barrier as the labour 
market, especially in low-skilled jobs, presents a drive towards the replacement 
of “old” and rooted immigrant workers with new and recently arrived migrants. 
Horizontal mobility is more widespread, but it does not always entail an 
improvement of the working conditions, and especially it does not involve all 
sectors as some jobs (housework or care work, for instance) mean the workers’ 
fate is sealed once they start performing such tasks. 
Access to work, the distribution of tasks, the role in the production process are 
all included in a permanent process of national, “racial” and ethno-religious 
selection, on two levels. On one hand, for a number of jobs and tasks, national 
workers are preferred over immigrant workers, and to justify the choice the 
usual chauvinist arguments are used, on skills, attitudes, vocations, availability 
or mentality of the former (rappresented as good, loyal, bright, efficient and 
diligent workers) and the latter (rappresented as lazy, disobedient, stupid, slow 
and troublemaker workers). On the other hand, there is a permanent selection of 
immigrant workers which, according to an alleged natural inclination or cultural 
vocation (be them positive or negative), includes and excludes specific 
populations and marginalizes earlier-immigrated workers, more rooted and 
demanding, by replacing them with recently-arrived migrants, less rooted and 
less stable. In specific sectors such as agriculture or construction, for instance, 
Maghreb workers have slowly been ousted, as they were more organized and 
unionised, and have been replaced with Eastern-European workers, in the 
context of the replacement of non-EU workers with workers from new EU 
members – who do not require a residence permit – hired irregularly without the 
risk of being accused of facilitation of illegal immigration. Finally, based on 
national stereotypes and false myths, often specific national groups are linked to 
specific jobs, specific parts of the production process, so much so that it is not 
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rare to witness the ethnicisation of production processes, confining single 
national groups to specific steps of the production.  
Such inequality at work, affecting the majority of immigrants, is the permanent 
drive of the racial inequality existing in Italy and is closely matched by a marked 
inequality in rights. The legislation and migration policy, as we shall see, have 
placed immigrants in a special legal system marked by half the rights and 
targeted unfavourable provisions (Bartoli 2008; Basso 2010; Morozzo Della Rocca 
2008). 
 
 
3. ANTI- IMMIGRANTS POLICIES BETWEEN 
PRECARISATION AND CRIMINALISATION 
 
Until 1990, when law No. 39 on the placement of immigrant workers was 
published, the main reference was the “Consolidated law on public security”, of 
1931, which equalled the presence of foreigners to that of an enemy in a control 
and security point of view, and such stance influenced the legislation on 
immigration of the following decades.   
In the meantime, the legal framework, extremely poor compared to the new 
situation, has been integrated over the years with the publication of several 
administrative circular letters which have been considered the main legal basis; 
indeed, the first regularisation was carried out by means of an administrative 
circular letter, as was the introduction of the residence permit. Secondary rank 
norms, internal provisions within ministries and public administration which are 
not sources of law, administrative circular letters do not provide a general 
political orientation and in their application leave great room for interpretation, 
discretion and arbitrariness; yet, such room has entailed a process of 
“administratisation of migration policies” (Gjergji 2013a, 2013b), still prevalent 
today especially in the field of asylum seekers. 
After this legal vacuum, law No. 39, expressing a closure towards immigration, 
set up a migration policy which institutionalised undocumented immigration 
and the social inferiority of immigrants, and which lay the foundations of the 
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provisions that followed. This law introduced a quota mechanism for immigrant 
workers with the creation of a three-year or yearly “inflow decree” which sets 
out the number of entries permitted for work, yet, in the first few years it was not 
passed or it established zero entries possible, while in the following years it 
established very low numbers, forcing, as a result, the majority of immigrants to 
embrace irregular work and undocumented migration. As for the tools to 
manage inflows, this law established – together with administrative expulsion – 
the recruitment by name mechanism, which sets forth, as a condition to enter the 
Italian territory, the presence of a work contract deriving from the prior 
encounter in the country of origin between the worker and the employer. This 
mechanism turned out to be rather inadequate for a productive system as the 
Italian one, marked by small-medium enterprises, a growth in the poor services 
sector and underground economy, but it enabled the processes of illegalisation of 
migration and growth of underground economy.  
This law, accompanied by a third regularisation, established that the bureaucracy 
to authorize the entry shall be started by the employer, a principle enshrined in 
the following laws on immigration, as the foundation of migration policies: law 
No. 189/2002 provides that the employer shall be the only subject who may 
require the work permit for the immigrant worker and having the possibility and 
subjective right to apply for a residence permit – the immigrant worker does not 
have such possibility and is not considered a subject of law, but rather the object 
of legal acts and other people’s rights.  
These key points of law No. 39, continued and strengthened by the laws that 
followed, had very negative results on the working and social lives of 
immigrants, forced to live as undocumented migrants waiting for a 
regularisation or an inflow decree (which is a regularisation under cover as it 
legalises those who are already in Italy) to obtain documents and become 
“legal”. The majority of immigrants has had and still has to go through a rough 
road, with a slow outflow from forced illegality and a transition towards regular 
work, where each step achieved corresponds to obtaining a segment of rights 
and fragments of social rights. 
Law No. 40, of 1998, considering immigration a structural element of the Italian 
society and presented as comprehensive legislation, included important chapters 
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on social and cultural aspects, yet its overall design resulted in the configuration 
of immigrants as bound to the socially-defined role of “subordinate” and in the 
institutionalisation of two categories of immigrants, “legal” and “illegal”, with 
differences as regards their rights.  
It introduced a bond between residence permit, work and dwelling, thus 
institutionalising the insertion model based on undocumented migration and 
social precarity, developed over the previous years, and binding the exercise of 
social rights to the migratory status. In line with law No. 39, it put down on 
paper the existing social practices, confirming that for immigrant workers 
“illegal” migration is a staging post, that their regularisation can only take place 
afterwards and at the discretion of their employer, thus creating a relationship of 
strong dependence of the worker from the employer. It facilitated the fact that an 
immigrant with a residence permit may relapse into undocumented or 
underdocumented migration if he is not able to keep his prerequisites for 
renewal; furthermore, with the guaranteed quota system and recruitment by 
name it subordinated legal entries to the needs of the labour market in the short 
term.  
Besides the creation of temporary detention centres, following the fragmentation 
of the types of residence permit and the multiplication of their durations, it 
produced a stratification of the legal status of immigrants, which led to the 
creation of several categories with different rights. Such difference lies at the base 
of the hierarchy of precarity and of the civic stratification among immigrant 
populations.  
In the 2000’s, migration policies were characterised by a two-fold process of 
precarisation and criminalisation of immigrants, in particular with the 
application of selective, restrictive and punitive politics (Basso 2010). Law No. 
189/2002, represented by the political slogan “zero immigration”, based on the 
new restrictive definition of the prerequisites for residence with the introduction 
of the “residence contract”, produced in reality a zero-rights immigration, 
extremely liable to be blackmailed, hanging on a thread, willing to do anything 
to avoid a relapse into undocumented immigration. It is based on the concept 
that residence must be strictly subordinated to the employment, the existence of 
an employment contract, the only element making the legality of the residence 
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legitimate, in a perspective of thorough jus laboris. Such design, materialised in 
the creation of a strict bond between work, residence permit and dwelling, 
turned out to be a powerful drive for the institutional production of mass 
clandestinity; this law, which stated it wanted to counter undocumented 
migration, actually created it, to then criminalize it – so much so that a good 
portion of the immigrants detained in prisons are there for breaking the law on 
immigration, an administrative offense. 
The numerous negative provisions of this law (the elimination of the “sponsor”; 
the reduction of the maximum validity of residence permits – maximum two 
years; the reduction of the maximum length of unemployment – six months; the 
increase in the maximum term of detention in temporary detention centres – 
from thirty to sixty days) determined a contraction of the rights of immigrants, 
the majority of which live in conditions of considerable precarity by law, 
increased by the interaction with the norms on liberalisation of the labour 
market. It reduced the number of legal entry channels and exacerbated the 
instability of residence, with the actual and permanent risk of a relapse into 
clandestinity; it determined a considerable dependence by the immigrant worker 
on the employer and subordinated the exercise of social rights to the validity of 
the work contract; it intensified the security aspects, making a stricter repression 
against undocumented migrants; it cleared the right of asylum from its 
effectiveness. Hence, it gave new momentum and orientation to the process of 
creation of a special legislation for immigrants, which afterwards found new 
systematisation and codification in law No. 94/2009 (“Provisions on public 
safety”). Law no. 189 formalized what previous laws, administrative circulars, 
the practices of the public administration, had produced over the previous 
decades, thus establishing the existence of a condition of legal, political and 
social inferiority for immigrants. 
Over this period, Italian migration policy picked up the German and Swiss 
experience of the Gastarbeiter, linking the duration of the residence permit to the 
duration of the employment contract. The maximum duration of the residence 
permit was reduced, inflows for seasonal work were promoted (to respond to the 
demand of just-in-time workforce by sectors marked by seasonality and to 
discourage the stabilisation of immigrant populations), family reunification was 
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hindered by raising the level of prerequisites, favouring individual immigration, 
for very mobile and barely rooted people. Yet, the return of the Gastarbeiter has 
taken place within a flexible capitalism – with its context of fragmentation, 
polarization and precarity – and in a situation of economic stagnation. Torn 
between a condition of rigidity determined by the norms on immigration and a 
condition of flexibility determined by the norms on the labour market, 
immigrants ended up being guest-workers in a period of economic crisis, rise of 
unemployment, growth of precarity, and weakening of the labour movement. 
In the last decade migration policies were further harshened and have taken on a 
markedly racial connotation; a plethora of punitive provisions by central and 
local administrations produced considerable institutional discrimination and 
inequality in rights. Striking examples are local resolutions and national norms 
against the poor, which linked access to residence in the municipality to a set 
income; the “ethnic” census of the Roma people; the limitations in the 
possibilities of family reunification; the tax on the residence permit; the extension 
of detention in the Centres for Identification and Expulsion up to six months; the 
impossibility for undocumented immigrants to obtain authorizations, certificates 
and administrative measures, among which social benefits; the reporting 
obligation to the police of undocumented immigrants for doctors, teachers and 
civil servants; the aggravating circumstance of clandestinity in case of crimes 
committed by undocumented immigrants: this measure, entailing an increase by 
a third of the sanction when the offense is perpetrated by an undocumented 
immigrant, in June 2010 was rejected by the Constitutional Court (sentence 
08/07/2010 n. 2491; Masera 2010) on grounds of unconstitutionality as it does not 
target an illicit behaviour, but rather a condition, a status, the subjective 
condition of undocumented. 
All this placed immigration in a situation of social clandestinity, of total precarity 
of the very existence of immigrants, symbolised by the creation of the residence 
                                                          
1 See the sentence available on the site of Italian Constitutional Court: 
Https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2010&numero=249
#. 
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permit with a point system, articulated in credits, obtained during the validity of 
the permit itself (a sort of game of chutes and ladders). 
This was accompanied by the return of assimilationism which, as in other 
European countries, further marked Italian migration policies according to the 
maximum adaptation of immigrants to the conditions imposed to them (work, 
housing, etc.). The anti-immigrants offensive on the legislation and propaganda 
plans – useful to keep under more pressure and control migrant work, more 
easily – supported migration policies characterized by a mixture of identity and 
security elements, aimed at discouraging social integration of immigrants and at 
supporting temporary fluctuating migrations, thus sustaining the demand of 
just-in-time workforce (Gjergji 2016). The new Gastarbeiter is forced to embrace 
the values of the receiving society and to be assimilated in the national culture, 
even though their presence is provisional and temporary. Migration policies, 
several social forces, opinion campaigns, public speeches, and thousands of local 
administration measures designed for immigrants a path marked by 
temporariness and assimilation, impermanence and forced embrace of national 
culture.  
The focus on security and repression of the Italian migration policies of the past 
few years was further confirmed by the provisions applied in the field of asylum 
seekers, which were enshrined in law No. 46/2017 – converting decree-law No. 
13 of 17 February 2017 “Urgent provisions to accelerate procedures on 
international protection”. This decree, born together with the decree-law on the 
security of cities (No. 14 of 20 February 2017), introduces a generalization of the 
Hotspot approach of the new European migration policy1, which entails several 
procedural and substantial changes. It entails the amendment to the first instance 
judgment of international protection, i.e. the replacement of “summary orders” 
with chamber proceedings without a hearing, thus eliminating the open public 
aspect of the proceedings, the oral cross-examination and the possibility for the 
judge to ask questions to the asylum seeker who lodged an appeal; it entails the 
                                                          
1 The hotspot approach is one of the pillars of the European Agenda on Migration 2015 
and it based on the large-scale implementation of asylum-seekers and refugees centres. 
See https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/.../2_hotspots_en.pdf (15.07.2017). 
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elimination, in cases for international protection, of the second instance judgment 
for asylum seekers appealing against a rejection (quite an exception in the field of 
subjective rights, protected by the Italian Constitution); it establishes special 
sections for asylum applications and repatriations in Courts of Appeal; it widens 
the network of Detention centers for undocumented migrants, which change 
their name from “Centres of Identification and Expulsion” into “Centres for 
repatriations” (in view of increasing the rate of rejections and expulsions); in case 
of notifications to be delivered to the asylum seeker, it entails the extension of the 
qualification as Public official to the person in charge of the Center or of the 
hosting structure; finally, it introduces voluntary community service work (as an 
expression of goodwill towards integration and as a sort of compensation for the 
state and the receiving society) (Pasqualetto 2017). Finally, in 2018 there was a 
marked harshening of migration policies, which ended up in state shipwrecks, in 
state deaths in the Mediterranean Sea. Such harshening, turned into the main 
feature of the national politics, has been feeding popular racism, leading to a 
manhunt on immigrants, Roma and asylum seekers. 
 
 
4.THE MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY OF STIGMATISATION 
 
The creation of a symbolic system of stigmatisation of immigration has 
supported and justified the material exploitation and the social inferiorisation of 
immigrants. Such symbolic inequality has had material consequences, feeding 
the production and reproduction of inequality. The most important social actor 
of this stigmatisation process was the system of mass-media, which presented 
immigration as a special reality, which needs special measures.  
In the ‘80s and ‘90s the public image of immigrants was associated to poverty, 
misery, marginality, but also to a far, primitive world (Belluati, Grossi and 
Viglongo 1995; Cotesta 1999; Iris 1991). The image of immigrants was that of the 
“pickaninny” from colonial postcards, belonging to an inferior humanity, poorly 
talented and evolved, fresh off the tree, who needed the help of civilized people 
to live. This image has its main sources in anti-African racism, of colonial origin, 
from which the discourse on the inferiority of non-white races and non-European 
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cultures was taken (Burgio 1999; Basso 2016); this is also a source of rhetoric, 
symbols, imagery, exoticism, paternalism, all adjusted to the new context to 
describe immigration in Italy. 
In the following years, the public image of immigrants has undergone a sudden, 
two-fold change. On one hand, it has become more negative, following a process 
of denigration carried out by the mass-media, which presented immigrants as a 
global threat (Binotto and Martino 2004; Binotto, Bruno and Lai 2016; Censis 
2002; Dal Lago 2009; Sibhatu 2004); on the other hand, it has greatly diversified, 
articulated in a heterogeneous complex of images according to nationality, 
culture of origin, social condition, etc. From generic terms such as “vu’ cumprà” 
(mimicking the way African street vendors would say “vuoi comprare?”, i.e. 
“would you like to buy?”) or “marocchino” (“Moroccan”, used for all migrants), 
through which immigrants were identified and devalued, a set of more 
“sophisticated” inferiorising stereotypes (the invader, the drug dealer, the 
profiteer, the idler, the criminal, etc.) was developed, based on a mechanism of 
selective racism, which identified “good communities” and “bad communities”, 
“desirable” and “undesirable immigrants”. Functional to the differential 
exploitation of immigrants, this selective mechanism was directed, from time to 
time, against immigrant populations that most massively entered the labour 
market, which were more stable, organized and rooted, i.e. against those 
populations that had increased their social centrality. First the Moroccans, then 
the Albanians, the Nigerians, the Chinese, the Romanians, were targeted by 
specific denigration campaigns, with the application of an anti-Arab, anti-
African, anti-Chinese racism, each with its own rhetoric and its own system of 
negative images.  
Turned into a fully-fledged media industry of contempt, the mass-media system 
has created a regime of racialised representation of the Italian society, useful to 
the subordinate insertion of immigrants, who have suffered constant 
categorizations, always revisited according to the circumstances (be them 
international, national or local), or to the different social groups affected. The 
differentiation of the public images of immigrants has targeted, according to the 
circumstances or the political situation, one population or the other, one social 
component or the other, creating different categories, identified as unusual, 
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dangerous, despicable, disgusting or gruesome. At the bottom of such hierarchy, 
based on the rhetoric and on the routine discourse (Maneri 2001, 2002) focused 
on social alarm and emergency, on opposites such as 
compatibility/incompatibility, reliability/unreliability, we find “undocumented 
immigrants”, “the Roma” and “the Muslim”; “the Albanian criminal”, “the 
Moroccan drug dealer”, “the deadbeat refugees”, “immigrant women: servants 
or prostitutes”, “the Chinese mafia”, “the second generation”, “the 
unaccompanied foreign minors”, “the foreign pupil who is too loud”.  
Last, but not least, over the 2000’s, the mass-media system has taken on a major 
role in the relationship between receiving society and immigrant populations, by 
carrying out a crucial function in backing, supporting, justifying and requesting 
exclusion policies and punitive measures. It has fed the process of racialisation of 
social relations, developed over time in the Italian society; it has demanded, 
supported and justified policies and interventions that international institutions 
clearly defined as discriminatory; it backed the discourse placing on immigrants 
the responsibility of the social issues (turned into an “ethnic issue”); it favoured 
the development of two separate societies or the presence of a caste of 
untouchables within the Italian society. 
 
 
5.CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this article I have examined the process of development of inequality linked to 
immigration, of a racial inequality based on immigration, in Italy today. This 
process is part of the general social processes evolved in the last few decades, 
especially in the global transformations which have taken place in the wake of 
neoliberal globalization, which highlighted old inequalities and created new 
ones. Migration is not a self-standing phenomenon, a “world of its own”, it is an 
integral part of the functioning of the social system and thus, inequality linked to 
immigration is a structural element both of the system of inequalities existing at 
global and national level, and of the process of creation of the world labour 
market (with all its stratifications) to which international migrations belong.  
In such global phenomena, social rights and social citizenship are even more 
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linked and subordinated to nationality. For immigrant workers, social rights in 
their receiving countries are largely tied to their migratory status in the State. 
Civic stratification, as a system of inequality (Morris 2002; Amaya-Castro 2017), 
justifies and fosters the idea of unequal, segmented rights based on nationality. 
To tackle inequality linked to immigration in so many countries in the world, a 
global social citizenship is at least necessary, going beyond the visible and 
invisible borders of national states and overcoming the “global 
inequalities/national social citizenship” aporia. Global social citizenship 
challenges this unequal segmentation, it may not an absolute solution, but it 
certainly is a progressive protective factor. 
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